

# Does going green pay off? The effect of an international environmental agreement on tropical timber trade

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## Abstract

In this paper we examine the impact of issue linkage in international environmental agreements on the linked issue by analyzing the effect of the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) on tropical timber trade. Issue linkage can increase both, the level of participation and the degree of stability of international environmental agreements, by reducing the incentive to free-ride on the others' behavior. We use a cross-sectional dataset on bilateral trade flows of tropical timber that additionally contains information on trading partners' economic and geographical characteristics. Our empirical specification is based on a gravity equation, which is estimated using Heckman's selection model to address the potentially systematic selection of trading partners. We find significantly positive impacts of the trade-related linkage in the ITTA on participating countries' level of tropical timber trade. Furthermore, we show that the poorer countries benefit more from this trade enhancing effect than richer countries.

**Keywords:** International environmental agreements, issue linkage, bilateral trade flows, product quality, sample selection.

**JEL:** F53, Q23, Q27, F18, L15

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# 1 Introduction

Issue linkage in international environmental agreements links the provision of a public good to specific concessions in an issue with excludable benefits, which is typically the provision of research and development cooperation, financial exchange or international trade relations. This instrument increases the number of policy options and so the possibility to compensate the losers from cooperation in the provision of the public good. Issue linkage is seen as one important determinant that positively influences the level of participation in and the stability of international environmental agreements. Despite the theoretic evidence of the importance of issue linkage on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements, almost no study exists which examines these issues in an econometric setting. Here is where this study starts.

Here is where our study starts. In particular, we examine the effect of an international environmental agreement on the linked issue, instead of concentrating on the agreement's environmental effects. More specifically, in this paper we analyze the effect of the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) on international trade of tropical timber (TT). The purpose of our article is twofold. First, we ask whether ITTA influences the country's decision to participate in as well as their volume of tropical timber trade. This question is motivated by a recent article by ? demonstrating that non-economic exchange between countries increases the likelihood of engaging in economic exchanges. Second, we decompose the effect of ITTA for different subsamples referring to their economic endowment to get an insight into the distribution of the agreement's effect across specific groups of countries. This is of particular interest as these distributional issues are frequently the reason of conflicts in international environmental negotiations.

To answer our research questions we rely on a theoretical model by ? that considers the relevance of quality parameters in determining bilateral trade flows. The econometric specification is based on a gravity equation which is estimated using Heckman's selection model to control for the potential systematic selection of countries into the group of tropical wood traders. We show that countries participating in ITTA form an exclusive club, in which the trade intensity of TT rises significantly in comparison with countries outside the club. These impacts occur even though we control for the effect of preferential trade agreements between the countries as well as potential leakage effects that may influence the trade of TT of non-participating countries. With respect to the distribution of the agreement's impact on TT trade between importers and exporters that differ in their economic endowment we find

that poor exporters benefit most by signing the ITTA. This result contradicts the frequently mentioned concerns that developing countries are negatively affected by trade-related measures in international environmental agreements. Even more, this impact points at the possibility for convergence in trade volumes between rich and poor exporters due to the issue linkage in ITTA, which would consequently increase the stability of the agreement.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which empirically examines the trade effect of issue-linkage in international environmental agreements. The quantification of such effects is important to compare the resulting benefits with the other benefits and costs that the agreement induces and to determine its net benefits. A major problem in the negotiations of international environmental agreements is that the costs and benefits of such an agreement are asymmetrically shared between the participating countries. Developing countries often resist strongly to adapt issue linkages, like trade-related measures, in international environmental agreements. They argue that these trade-related measures will have a negative economic impact as a result of restrictions in market access through certification requirements, performance mandates, conformity assessments and labeling standards (?). Knowledge of the asymmetric distribution of this impact across countries makes future negotiations on international environmental agreements more efficient.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we will give a brief literature overview on international environmental agreements and discuss the concept of linking trade-related measures in international environmental agreements in more detail. Furthermore, we will introduce our international environmental agreement of interest, the International Tropical Timber Agreement. In section 3 we will describe our theoretical and empirical approach to analyze the trade effects of issue linkage in international environmental agreements. In section 4 we will present our data and in section 5 we will discuss our results. The last section concludes.

## 2 Background and previous literature

Today, environmental issues with transboundary impact, like ozone depletion, pollution of oceans and rivers, overexploitation of natural resources and deforestation of world's forests, are addressed in numerous international environmental agreements. Success or failure of such agreements often depend on both the participation and the compliance behavior of the relevant countries. But many international environmental agreements share the following features, which restrain their success. First, their main objective is the provision of a public good, which leads to collective ac-

tion problems. Second, since states are sovereign in their decision to provide the public good or to free-ride on the others countries' behavior, international environmental agreements have to be self-enforcing (?). Third, such agreements regularly bring countries together, which differ in their economic, institutional and ecologic endowment and therefore, asymmetrically share the benefits and costs of abatement.

To overcome these problems, the literature on international environmental agreements suggests rearranging the incentive structure so that instable coalition partners join the agreement and comply with the agreement's obligations (?). This can be done for instance by linking different policy issues.<sup>1</sup> Alternative measures influencing the incentive structure of international environmental agreement discussed in the literature are a minimum participation clause (?, ?) and in-kind and cash transfers (?, ?, ?).<sup>2</sup>

Another problem influencing the participation decision of countries is a phenomenon known as leakage. Suppose that a country's production is more costly due to its participation in an international environmental agreement. Then, the comparative advantage of the pollution-intensive industries will shift to non-participating countries and the world price will change. In particular, the non-participating countries will increase their output of the dirty good leading to a situation in which the provision of the global public good is less than the initial level of provision undertaken by the participating countries (?). Furthermore, leakage increases the incentive to free-ride if the free-riders' benefits from consumption of the public good that complying countries provide are sufficiently large. Issue linkage can reduce or even eliminate leakage effects by providing a credible set of specific sanctions for non-complying and non-participating countries (?).

Since the early 1990s, the literature that analyzes the effects of different measures on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements has grown continuously. While this literature is mainly based on using game theoretic approaches to examine the effect of specific incentive structures on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements, only a few studies determine these issues systematically in an econometric framework.<sup>3</sup> The majority of empirical contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance ?, ?, ?, ?.

<sup>2</sup>For an overview on the existing literature and an excellent discussion see for instance ? or ?.

<sup>3</sup> Another strand of literature examines the success of international environmental agreements in reaching the specified environmental target. ? and ? evaluated the effects of the Montreal Protocol on CFC emissions and the Oslo Protocol sulphur emissions respectively. Their results suggest that the cooperative gains are not significant higher than the non-cooperative gains. Otherwise, ? examining the Oslo Protocol and ? evaluating the impact of the 1988 Sofia Protocol could determine cooperative gains compared to the non-cooperative outcome.

deals with the participation decision of countries and determines factors influencing this decision (?, ?, ?). In a recent article, ? theoretically demonstrate that non-economic exchange between countries increases the likelihood of engaging in economic exchanges. This arises from the fact that non-economic engagement, first, can signal a higher level of trustworthiness and, second, provides the possibility of punishing the partner in one domain for non-cooperation in the other domain. In a further step they empirically verify these findings and show that countries with a greater participation in international environmental agreements also have higher trade in assets. They conclude that non-cooperative behavior is costly for countries due to the lost of such indirect benefits.

## 2.1 The Linked Issue - Trade-Related Measures in International Environmental Agreements

Trade-related measures are one part of a range of measures designed to increase the formation and stability of agreements. Today they are integrated in a great number of international environmental agreements on a wide range of topics. Examples are the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species and our agreement of interest, the International Tropical Timber Agreement promoting the sustainable management of tropical forests, the development of tropical forest industries through international cooperation and the international trade in TT.<sup>4</sup> Trade-related measures help to improve the participation in and compliance with international environmental agreements, if markets are imperfect and distorted by asymmetries, if policy failures have to be corrected or if strong incentives for free-riding and leakage exists. Furthermore, they provide a possibility of monitoring and controlling trade in products in cases where otherwise trade would lead to or contribute to environmental damage, like in the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species or the ITTA.<sup>5</sup> Measures that may influence international trade vary widely and include on the one hand specific reporting, labeling or other identifications requirements, like movement documents and on the other hand more invasive forms, like general and targeted import/export bans and market transformation

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<sup>4</sup> For an detailed overview and discussion of international environmental agreements containing trade-related measures see WTO, *Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected MEAs*, WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.1(2001).

<sup>5</sup> For a general analysis and discussion of trade-related measures in international environmental agreements see ? or ?.

measures, like tariffs, subsidies or other form of fiscal measures (?). The invasive forms provide a means of first, punishing non-cooperative behavior of participating countries, and second, reducing the competitive advantage of non-participating countries and in this way dampening the problem of leakage. To influence behavior these threatend punishments must be both credible and sufficiently severe (?). But these requirements are difficult to fulfill, because every punishment harm cooperating as well as non-cooperating countries. Furthermore, due to the fact that countries interact on various issues and through numerous channels applications of trade restrictions can be limited, for example in cases where trade restrictions violate the non-discrimination provision of the GATT/WTO agreement (?). Therefore, trade-related measures in international environmental agreements are usually part of a package of measures that include non-invasive measures, like reporting, labeling and information requirements, non-trade measures, like quotas, and supportive measures which can be financial and technical support, training and R&D linkages (?). The International Tropical Timber Agreement consists mainly of non-invasive measures, like increasing market transparency, providing trade and price data, reducing market distorting illegal logging practices and providing a platform for producers and consumers of tropical wood. Additionally, due to the introduction of the Bali Partnership Fund which allocates financial assistance to ITTA-producer countries to implement a sustainable management of TT, supportive measures have been included.

## **2.2 The International Tropical Timber Agreement**

In 1983, following a growing public debate on the problems of the substantial degradation and destruction of the world's forests, an international environmental agreement on management and trade of TT - the so called International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) - was signed originally by 36 producer and 34 consumer countries and entered into force three years later. Under the agreement the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), with its decision-making and recommendatory body, the International Tropical Timber Council, was established. The ITTA's primary objectives are first, the protection of natural tropical forests from destruction, degradation and excision, and second, the strengthening of TT trade. Until now the original agreement was renegotiated two times, in 1994 as well as in 2006. While the ITTA 1983 was originally designed as a commodity-based agreement with emphasis on strengthening the members' TT markets, the ITTA 1994 increased, with the introduction of the 'ITTO Objective 2000' and the Bali Partnership Fund, the

importance of the other main objective - the sustainable use of the forest resource - substantially. Today the ITTA 2006 is signed by 59 member countries, which represents about 80 percent of the world's tropical forests. The ITTO's 2006 main tasks are still the fostering of the international TT trade, on the one hand, and the support of sustainable tropical forest management, by implementing forest certification schemes, developing criteria and indicators for sustainable management, by introducing community forestry schemes and by making harvesting data of tropical wood more transparent, on the other hand.

### 3 Theoretical model and empirical specification

#### 3.1 Theoretical framework

We base our theoretical model for TT on the arguments given in ?, ? and ?. Accordingly, we assume that tropical wood exports of country  $i$  to country  $j$ ,  $X_{ij}$ , are based on the monopolistic competition model with CES-preferences. In this model, mark-up pricing of firms in country  $i$  leads to mills prices

$$p_i = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} c_i. \quad (1)$$

$\sigma$  denotes the elasticity of substitution, which is constant and uniform across countries and  $c_i$  stands for marginal costs of wood production, which are assumed to be the same for all firms in a country.

For each of the  $n_i$  tropical wood extracting firms (varieties) in country  $i$  the demand function in country  $j$  is given by

$$x_{ij} = \frac{\left(\frac{p_i \tau_{ij}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_j}}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\sum_{h=1}^J n_h \left(\frac{p_h \tau_{hj}}{\theta_h^{\gamma_j}}\right)^{1-\sigma}} \phi Y_j \quad (2)$$

where  $\tau_{ij}$  represents iceberg-type transportation costs. Following ?,  $\theta_i$  is a quality indicator for production,  $\gamma_j$  stands for the intensity of preference for quality.  $\phi Y_j$  defines the expenditures on wood products which are a fraction of  $\phi$  of GDP.

The crucial determinant in this analysis is the role of product (environmental) quality, pictured by  $\theta_i^{\gamma_j}$ , in trading TT. To keep the model simple we assume that the supply of higher quality is associated with higher fixed costs but does not effect the variable costs. As ?, we assume that demand and supply for environmental quality is positively related to both, the log of real income per-capita of the suppliers,  $y_i$ ,

and to that of the consumers,  $y_j$ . Additionally, we also suppose that the supply of and demand for environmental qualitative TT products is higher for countries that signed an ITTA. Specifically,  $\theta_i$  and  $\gamma_j$  are parameterized as

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_j &= \gamma + \delta D_j + \beta y_j \\ \theta_i &= e^{kD_i} e^{\alpha y_i}.\end{aligned}$$

so that  $\theta_i^{\gamma_j}$  reads after taking logs as

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_j \ln \theta_i &= (\delta D_j + \beta y_j) (D_i k + \alpha y_i) \\ &= \delta k D_j D_i + \beta D_i k y_j + \delta \alpha D_j y_i + \beta \alpha y_j y_i\end{aligned}\tag{3}$$

We define  $D_i = 0$  whenever an exporter is not an ITTA-member, i.e. only supplies a base quality.  $D_i = 1$  indicates that the exporter provides a higher environmental quality due to its ITTA status. Similarly,  $D_j = 1$  ( $D_j = 0$ ) if the importing country is (not) part of the ITTA. This formulation implies that the trading partners' ITTA status as well as their GDP/capita influences quality demand and supply. We argue that rich countries tend to consume products with a high environmental quality in the sense that their willingness to pay for quality level  $\theta_i$ , captured by  $\gamma_j$ , is higher the richer the people in the importing country are. In addition, signing the ITTA ( $D_j = 1$ ) as an importer country reveals its preference for higher environmental quality. Also, rich countries are more able to supply high environmental quality and if they sign the ITTA as a supplier ( $D_i = 1$ ) they will provide higher environmental quality as compared to the base level. This base effect, i.e.,  $D_i = 0$  and  $D_j = 0$ , is solely determined by the exporters' and importers' GDP/capita, i.e.,  $y_i$  and  $y_j$ . As ? shows, this term can be used to test for the Linder hypothesis which suggest that countries with similar GDP/capita trades more intensively with each other. Depending on the trading partners' status of their ITTA-membership and their GDP/capita, we therefore can observe four different combinations of the environmental quality effects of ITTA:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln(\theta_i^{\gamma_j}) &= \beta \alpha y_j y_i && \text{if } D_i = 0 \text{ and } D_j = 0 \\ \ln(\theta_i^{\gamma_j}) &= \beta \alpha y_j y_i + \delta \alpha D_j y_i && \text{if } D_i = 0 \text{ and } D_j = 1 \\ \ln(\theta_i^{\gamma_j}) &= \beta \alpha y_j y_i + \beta D_i k y_j && \text{if } D_i = 1 \text{ and } D_j = 0 \\ \ln(\theta_i^{\gamma_j}) &= \beta \alpha y_j y_i + \delta \alpha D_j y_i + \beta D_i k y_j + \delta k D_j D_i && \text{if } D_i = 1 \text{ and } D_j = 1\end{aligned}\tag{4}$$

Considering, that countries may systematically select into the group of TT traders, we end up with two crucial specifications (a detailed discussion of the theoretical motivation is given in the Appendix). Following the literature, we assume free entry of suppliers into the import markets at fixed costs ( $f_{ij}\theta_i$ ) which drives profits down to zero. Based on this zero profit condition and under the assumption that exporter profits are separable across destination countries one may define a latent variable ( $V_{ij}^*$ ) that captures the propensity of exporter country  $i$  to serve import market  $j$ . In our econometric application we specify the latent variable as

$$V_{ij}^* = (1 - \sigma) \ln \tau_{ij} + \sigma(\gamma_j - \gamma_i) \ln \theta_i + \ln(P_j^{\sigma-1}Y_j) - \ln(P_i^{\sigma-1}Y_i) + \ln\left(\frac{f_{ii}}{f_{ij}}\right) \quad (5)$$

$V_{ij} = 1$  if  $V_{ij}^* > 0$  and is unobserved otherwise

and define the indicator variable  $V_{ij}$  taking the value 1 if exports from country  $i$  to  $j$  are observed and 0 otherwise. This specification implies that exports from  $i$  to  $j$  are more likely observed the lower the trade barriers  $\tau_{ij}$  and fixed trade costs  $f_{ij}$  are. Note, the price indices  $P_j$  also affect the propensity to export. Finally, the participation in ITTA not only influences the magnitude of the trade flows (internal margin) but also the decision of an exporter to serve a foreign market at all (external margin).

The second equation refers to the nominal value of TT exports of country  $i$  to country  $j$ ,  $X_{ij}$ :

$$\ln X_{ij} = (1 - \sigma) \ln \tau_{ij} + (\sigma - 1)\gamma_j \ln \theta_i + \ln(\lambda_j P_j^{\sigma-1}) + \ln(\vartheta_i \Pi_i^{\sigma-1}) + \ln(Y\phi) \quad (6)$$

if  $V_{ij} = 1$  and 0 otherwise

### 3.2 Econometric specification

The structural gravity equation derived in the Appendix motivates a Heckman-sample selection model (?) with exporter and importer dummies as our econometric specification. Note, these dummies capture all determinants that are either importer or exporter specific. In particular, in the trade flow equation the dummies cover the trade resistance terms  $\ln(\lambda_j P_j^{\sigma-1})$  and  $\ln(\vartheta_i \Pi_i^{\sigma-1})$ , while the exporter and importer dummies of selection equation capture the terms  $\gamma_i \ln \theta_i$ ,  $\ln(P_j^{\sigma-1}Y_j)$  and  $\ln(P_i^{\sigma-1}Y_i)$ .

The econometric model estimated below pools over four relevant product classes indexed by  $z$ . We substitute  $\gamma_j \ln \theta_i$  in equation (6) by equation (3) and add a stochastic disturbance term. Then, the country  $j$ 's imports  $X$  of products  $z$  origi-

nated in country  $i$  can be described as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \ln X_{ijz} = & a_0 + a_1(\ln y_j - \ln y_i)^2 + a_2 D_j \ln y_i + a_3 D_i \ln y_j + a_4 D_j D_i \\ & + a_5 DIST_{ij} + c_i + m_j + p_z + \epsilon_{ijz} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

$y_j$  ( $y_i$ ) represents the importer's (exporter's) GDP/capita.  $D_j$  ( $D_i$ ) describes the country's ITTA membership and equals one when the importer (exporter) approved the ITTA,  $D_j D_i$  is one if both trading partners signed the ITTA.  $(\ln y_j - \ln y_i)$  stands for the Linder term and measures the distance in the countries' GDP/capita.<sup>6</sup>  $DIST$  comprises the distance measures. In particular, it controls for the role of regional trade agreements (RTA) in force, the influence of geographical distance (measured in km) between the countries' main cities, and the effects of having a common border, colonial relationship, common colonizer and/or common language. Finally,  $c_i$ ,  $m_j$  and  $p_z$  capture exporter, importer and product fixed effects and  $\epsilon$  represents the error term.

We expect a positive sign on  $a_2$ ,  $a_3$  and  $a_4$  indicating that high preferences for environmental quality together with the provision of environmentally qualitative goods increase the nominal value of TT trade. According to the Linder Hypothesis,  $a_1$  should be negative as countries that are dissimilar in their GDP/capita are expected to trade less intensively with each other.

As highlighted above, one has to control for the systematic selection of countries into the group of TT traders. The parameterization of participation in TT trade is based on equation (5). Since fixed trade costs remain unobserved, we use the same explanatory variables as in the trade flows equation as theory does not provide bilateral indicators that would define exclusion restrictions (see Chapter 16.5.5. in ?).

$$\begin{aligned} \ln V_{ijz}^* = & b_0 + b_1(\ln y_j - \ln y_i)^2 + b_2 D_j \ln y_i + b_3 D_i \ln y_j + b_4 D_j D_i \\ & + b_5 DIST_{ij} + c_i + m_j + p_z + \nu_{ijz} \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

The following section describes the data used to empirically analyze the patterns in TT trade.

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<sup>6</sup>Note, that the squared log difference in the countries GDP/capita can be derived from  $\ln y_j \ln y_i$  considering that  $\ln y_j \ln y_i = 0.5 \ln y_j^2 + 0.5 \ln y_i^2 - 0.5(\ln y_j - \ln y_i)^2$ .  $y_j^2$  and  $y_i^2$  are captured in the importer and exporter fixed effects.

## 4 The data

### 4.1 Data description and modification

Our data stems from a number of sources. Information on bilateral tropical wood imports are taken from the UN’s commodity trade statistic database, which reports trade data up to a 6 digit classification of products. In particular, we examine nominal trade flows of TT<sup>7</sup>. We refer to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 1996 (HS1996) which classifies TT into 10 different codes (for an detail definition, see A2 in the Appendix) and covers a period of 13 years (1996 to 2008). Geographical information (distance between the trading partners, common language, contiguity, colonial linkages) is taken form the CEPPII data base. Data on the trading partners’ GDP/capita stem from the World Development Indicators 2009 compiled by the World Bank. Regional trade agreements in force are reported in the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Information System<sup>8</sup>. Our crucial independent variable, the status of a country’s ITTA membership, is defined through Annex A and Annex B of the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement (?).

Unfortunately, for some trading partners only a few observations per product class and year are available. We therefore average our sample over time and 4-digit classes (instead of using the 6-digit classification). As the set of countries that trade TT may systematically differ from the countries that do not trade, we start with a sample of all exporter and importer countries that reported at least one trade flow. We drop exporters that are not tropical countries as they – by definition – cannot produce tropical wood (but rather represent intermediary trade partners). Then, we are left with a sample of 47,628 observations whereof about 10 % (i.e., 4,753 observations) include information on TT trade, i.e. imports in  $TT > 0$ .

### 4.2 Descriptive statistics

As shown in the Table 1, the average value of TT imported amounts to 742,500 US\$. The average GDP/capita (measured in constant 2000 US\$) of the importers is more than twice as large as the average GDP/capita of the exporting country. The average distance between the two trading partner is about 8,700 km and only 2 % of the trading partners share a common border. 20 % of the trading partner have their language in common, about 14 % have (had) colonial links. Regional trade

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<sup>7</sup> According to ITTA, TT is defined as non-coniferous tropical wood for industrial uses, which grows or is produced in the countries situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. This definition involve logs, veneer sheets, sawnwood and plywood (?).

<sup>8</sup><http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx>

agreements are in force between 18 % of the trading partners and about 40 % of the countries signed the ITTA.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
Imports (in 1,000 US\$)	4753	742.526	10150.280	0.004	594300
GDP/capita (importer)	47628	7221.197	9859.441	110.310	47608
GDP/capita (exporter)	47628	3250.131	4886.590	110.281	26698
Distance (in km)	47628	8694.206	4451.390	105.181	19904
Contiguity	47628	0.016	0.127	0	1
Com. language	47628	0.203	0.402	0	1
Colonial link	47628	0.008	0.087	0	1
Com. Colonizer	47628	0.137	0.344	0	1
Regional trade agreements	47628	0.184	0.387	0	1
ITTA (importer)	47628	0.385	0.487	0	1
ITTA (exporter)	47628	0.395	0.489	0	1

148 importing and 81 exporting countries are involved in trading TT. Table 2 lists the ten largest importers and exporters with respect to the aggregated value of TT imported. As Table 2 highlights, Japan is by far the largest importer of TT and spends more than one billion US\$ on TT. The United States and China rank second and third, respectively. India and Malaysia are the two most important supplier followed by China whose exports are only one third in value that the two leading exporters ship abroad.

Table 3 presents the trade flows in TT in percent of the total import value (upper panel) and in percent of the total quantity imported (lower panel) for each continent pair. About 50 % of the total TT trade occurs within Asia. Trade flows from Africa to Europe (Asia to Europe) rank second (third) but are considerably lower, namely 15 % (9 %). The fourth most important destination for TT originated in Asia are the United states accounting for a proportion of 8 %. The remaining exporter-importer combinations are with respect to the import value as well as quantity imported of minor relevance. Overall, Asia accounts for 56 %, Europe for 26 % and North America for 13 % of the total import value of TT. The largest exporters (ranked by the import value of TT) are Asia, Africa and South America whose shares amount to 67 %, 24 % and 7 %, respectively. Considering the quantity imported, we find similar patterns as for the trade values although the proportions slightly differ.

Table 4 compares the trade flows across countries that signed or did not signed an ITTA. Among the four subgroups, the group where both trading partners assigned an ITTA, accounts for 84 % of total trade flows. Second rank those countries where

Table 2: Largest importers and exporters of TT (ranked by aggregated value imported)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Value imported<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Quantity imported<sup>b</sup></i>
Importers of TT (codes 4403, 4407, 4408, 4412)		
Japan	1063	2,552,084
United States	362	513,977
China	274	203,682
Republic of Korea	235	138,118
Italy	145	90,703
France	143	114,512
India	113	111,148
Germany	104	86,581
Netherlands	94	120,187
Belgium	92	20,327
Exporters of TT (codes 4403, 4407, 4408, 4412)		
India	1122	1,655,714
Malaysia	922	1,651,422
Gabon	310	493,935
Cameroon	261	415,105
China	187	108,157
Brazil	135	146,564
Cote d'Ivoire	135	135,964
Ghana	83	42,506
Ecuador	31	23,038
Peru	30	13,494

*Notes:* <sup>a</sup> Sum of TT imports (in million US\$); <sup>b</sup> Sum of TT imports (in million m<sup>3</sup>).

the exporter but not the importer is an ITTA member but the respective trade share is considerably lower (13 %) than for the former group.

Clearly, this huge difference may result from various factors that are unrelated to the countries' ITTA status. The following section aims at analyzing the trade flows in more detail and to focus the role of ITTA assignments for the nominal value of TT trade.

## 5 The estimation results

Our results are based on the econometric specifications derived in Section 3.2. As argued, we control for potential selection among trading partners by implementing Heckman's two-step estimator. The respective output is given in Table 5 and shows the selection and outcome equation.

Table 3: Trade flows in TT in % of import value and quantity

<i>Exporter</i>	<i>Importer</i>						Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
TT, overall import value: 3,529 mill. USD)							
(1) Africa	1.98	6.61	0.05	14.54	1.06	0.05	24.29
(2) Asia	1.47	47.54	0.71	8.78	8.21	0.12	66.84
(3) Australia	0.01	0.16	0.05	0.05	0.09	–	0.35
(4) Europe	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
(5) North America	0.01	0.53	0.00	0.18	0.46	0.01	1.18
(6) South America	0.06	1.47	0.05	2.10	3.00	0.65	7.33
Total	3.530	56.31	0.86	25.65	12.82	0.83	100.00
TT, overall quantity imported: 5,162 bill. m <sup>3</sup>							
(1) Africa	3.48	6.12	0.76	13.86	0.32	0.06	24.60
(2) Asia	1.85	56.91	0.58	2.47	8.33	0.00	70.13
(3) Australia	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.02	0.02	–	0.23
(4) Europe	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
(5) North America	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.10	0.21	0.00	0.40
(6) South America	0.06	0.71	0.03	1.11	2.15	0.57	4.61
Total	5.40	63.99	1.40	17.55	11.03	0.63	100.00

*Notes:* Figures are based on the aggregate bilateral trade flows for the product classes 4403, 4407, 4408 and 4412. ‘–’ indicates that no bilateral trade flows occurred between these regions; ‘0.00’ means that bilateral trade is of minor value (smaller than a one-hundredth of a percent).

Table 5 highlights that distance significantly determines the probability of taking part in TT trading. In particular, the probability decreases with increasing geographical distance (measured in km<sup>2</sup>) and is higher for countries that share a common border, have a common language or have had colonial relationships. We also find strong evidence that the existence of a regional trade agreement makes it more likely that countries trade with each other. With respect to the ITTA and the countries’ GDP/capita (i.e., our proxies for environmental quality) we find that the probability of trading is higher if both trading partners approved the ITTA. While the probability further increases with increasing GDP/capita of the importer, given that the exporter signed the ITTA, the exporter’s GDP/capita does not influence the chance of trading. Finally, the quadratic log difference in the countries’ GDP/capita indicates that the probability of trading is higher for trading partners that diverge with respect to their GDP/capita.

Table 4: Trade flows in TT in % of import value and quantity

<i>Exporter</i>	<i>Importer</i>		Total
	(1)	(2)	
TT, overall import value: 3,529 mill. USD			
(1) no ITTA	1.03	2.13	3.15
(2) ITTA	12.87	83.98	96.85
Total	13.90	86.10	100.00
TT, overall quantity imported: 5,162 bill. m <sup>3</sup>			
(1) no ITTA	3.81	2.06	5.87
(2) ITTA	7.33	86.80	94.13
Total	11.14	88.86	100.00

*Notes:* Figures are based on the aggregate bilateral trade flows for the product classes 4403, 4407, 4408 and 4412.

Table 5: Trade flows in TT – estimation results

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>Heckman's selection model</i>	
	selection	outcome
$D_i D_j$	0.105*	0.518***
$D_i * \ln y_j$	0.112***	0.159***
$D_j * \ln y_i$	-0.011	-0.094**
$(\ln y_i - \ln y_j)^2$	0.008**	-0.020**
<i>RTA</i>	0.134***	-0.045
$\ln distance$	-0.769***	-1.157***
<i>contiguity</i>	0.546***	0.277*
<i>comlanguage</i>	0.296***	0.305***
<i>comcolonizer</i>	0.276***	0.339**
<i>colony</i>	0.295***	0.515***
<i>Mills ratio</i>		1.552***
Observations		47628
<i>F-tests</i>		
Product class effects		1403.36***
Exporter and importer effects		6844.38***

*Notes:* Constant and fixed effects not reported. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.

Which effect do we find for the nominal value of trade flows? First of all, the significant mills ratio shown in the Heckman specification provides evidence that

systematic selection is an issue and has to be controlled for to achieve reliable estimates. With respect to the influence of the distance parameters we find similar effects as in the selection regression with the exception that RTAs in force increase the probability of trading but do not affect the level of trade.

How do the environmental quality indicators influence the trade flows in TT? The base effect, the coefficient on the Linder term (quadratic log difference in the trading partner's GDP/capita) supports the Linder hypothesis which assumes that countries with dissimilar production and consumption patterns trade with each other less intensely. As mentioned, however, dissimilarities in GDP/capita apparently positively influence the probability of trading TT. The positive and highly significant coefficient on  $D_i D_j$  indicates higher trade flows if both trading partners approved the ITTA. Given that the exporter signed the ITTA, TT shipments rise with increasing GDP/capita of the importer. While the exporter's GDP/capita does not influence the probability of trading, its interaction with the importer's ITTA status is significantly negative in the outcome equation indicating lower trade flows with increasing GDP/capita of the exporter.

What do these impacts due to ITTA imply? The effect regarding  $D_i D_j$  results from two sources. First, by agreeing on trade requirements ITTA signatories can reduce their transaction costs. Second,  $D_i D_j$  also indicates that the importer's preference for environmental quality is matched by the exporter's qualitative production which - as we see - increases the probability of TT trading as well as its volume. The interactions with the ITTA assignment dummies and the trading partners GDP/capita also reveal interesting patterns. The coefficient on the first interaction, the exporter's ITTA membership with the importer's GDP/capita, imply that once the exporter indicates a qualitatively higher production (i.e., signs the ITTA), the probability as well as the magnitude of TT trade is increasing with increasing GDP/capita of the importer. The second interaction, importer's ITTA status with the exporter's GDP/capita, reveals that - given the importer approved the ITTA - poor countries are able to export more than rich exporting countries. This significant effect is the only one which does not meet our expectations: Given, that rich exporters have a comparative advantage in producing high quality goods the importer demands (ITTA member), we would have expect that the trade flows increases with increasing GDP/capita of the exporter. The significant negative impact observed may result from heterogeneity across countries that we control for via the country fixed effects but cannot disentangle in detail.

Overall, these effects show that ITTA significantly determines the probability as well as the trade flows in TT. But how would have the effect looked like in a world

with no ITTA membership? We answer this question by creating a counterfactual that represents a world where neither the exporter nor the importer are ITTA signatories, i.e.,  $D_i = D_j = 0$  and, hence,  $D_j D_i = 0$ . Using the Heckman estimates shown in Table 5, we predict the conditional means in TT imports for the country's current ITTA status and compare these values with the respective output in the counterfactual world. Accordingly, we determine the difference in the propensity of trading by comparing the actual with the constructed situation. The change in the trade flows (change in propensity of trading) due to the countries' ITTA membership is measured as percentages (percentage points) of the counterfactual, i.e. no ITTA membership. Following ?, we interpret the estimated effect of ITTA membership as weighted average of the dyadic specific difference to the counterfactual situation without the agreement.

As we are interested in examining potential differences in the trade effects between rich and poor traders, we distinguish between four groups of participants: poor exporter and importer; poor exporter and rich importer; rich exporter and poor importer and rich exporter and importer. We define countries as poor (rich) if their GDP/capita lies below (above) the 25 (75) percentile. Table 6 shows the mean effects of the ITTA membership for all exporters and importers if they are both ITTA members compared to a situation where non of them signed the ITTA.

Table 6: Trade effects of ITTA membership

<i>Exporter</i>	<i>Change in trade flows<sup>a</sup></i>			<i>Change in propensity<sup>a</sup></i>		
	<i>Importer</i>			<i>Importer</i>		
	Poor	Rich	Total	Poor	Rich	Total
Poor	32.58	81.13	75.48	5.47	26.42	20.83
Rich	8.72	47.46	44.46	3.46	25.52	18.99
Total	17.77	56.91	53.44	3.99	25.78	19.52

*Notes:* Poor (rich) country, if country's GDP/capita is below (above) the 25th (75th) percentile. <sup>a</sup> Mean difference in trade flows (in %) and in participation rate (in percentage points) if both trading partners are ITTA members ( $D_i D_j = 1$ ) compared to a world with no ITTA, i.e.,  $D_i = D_j = 0$ .

The impact of the ITTA on the level of trade is largest if poor exporting and rich importing countries trade with each other. In this case, TT trade is 81 % higher than if the countries were not signatories. The group of rich exporters and rich importers (poor exporters and importers) that both signed the ITTA rank second (third) with an increase of 47 % (33 %) in trade flows compared to the counterfactual of no ITTA membership. Overall, poor exporters face an increase of 75 % in TT shipments due to

their ITTA-membership while rich importers (exporters) can enhance their imports by more than 50 % (44 %). Poor importers experience the modest rise of 18 % in TT shipments.

Our theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that the ITTA also determines the propensity of trading. The respective figures in Table 6 reveal only minor variation between poor and rich exporters while the difference between poor and rich importers is considerable. In particular, the increase in the probability of trading with rich (poor) importers amounts to about 26 (3 to 5) percentage points for the poor as well as the rich exporters. From this follows that the overall increase in the propensity of trading due to the ITTA membership is highest for rich importers (26 %) while rich and poor exporters face a similar rise (about 19% to 21 %). As with the trade flows, the impact on ITTA is smallest for poor importers.

## 6 Conclusions

This paper examines the impact of the trade-related measures linked to the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) on the propensity of trading tropical timber (TT) and the level of TT shipments. We use a monopolistic competition setting that allows for implementing environmental quality indicators to derive relevant factors that determine the probability and level of TT trade. The theoretical model suggests that the environmental quality in production and the consumers' preference for environmental quality determine the probability of trading as well as the level of trade. The model also motivates the use of Heckman's two-step estimator for the empirical analysis in order to control for systematic selection of traders.

We use data on bilateral trade flows in TT timber which serves as the dependent variable in this analysis. Environmental quality in production and demand for environmental quality is pictured by the trading partners' GDP/capita and their ITTA membership. Information on bilateral distances as well as membership in preferential trade agreements are included as further control variables.

The estimation results reveal that countries, participating in ITTA, are going to form an exclusive club, in which the trade intensity of TT significantly rises on average in comparison with countries outside the club. This impact is strong enough to emerge even though we also control for the effect of preferential trade agreements between the countries as well as potential leakage effects influencing the trade in TT. Furthermore, we picture the distribution of the ITTA's trade impact between importing and exporting countries that differ in their GDP/capita and find that poor exporters benefit most by signing the agreement. These results are in

contrast with the common argument that international environmental agreements adversely affect developing countries. Beyond that, trade linkages in international environmental agreements could contribute to the convergence between poor and rich countries and consequently enhance the agreement's stability.

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# Appendix

## Modeling the probability and level of TT trading

The decision to participate in TT trading depends on the country  $i$ 's operating profits and fixed costs  $f_{ij}$  of serving the foreign market  $j$ . Note, overall profits of a country  $i$ 's firm are assumed to be separable across importing countries. The profits that a typical country  $i$  earns in market  $j$  are then given by

$$\pi_{ij} = \frac{1}{\sigma-1} c_i \tau_{ij} x_{ij} - f_{ij} \theta_i. \quad (\text{A1})$$

This implies that market  $j$  is served by country  $i$  whenever  $\pi_{ij} \geq 0$ . Since we assume that firms are always active in the domestic market this condition is equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\tau_{ij} \left( \frac{p_i \tau_{ij}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_j}} \right)^{-\sigma} P_j^{\sigma-1} Y_j}{\left( \frac{p_i}{\theta_i} \right)^{-\sigma} P_i^{\sigma-1} Y_i} &\geq \frac{f_{ij}}{f_{ii}} \\ \frac{\tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} \theta_i^{\sigma \gamma_j} P_j^{\sigma-1} Y_j}{\theta_i^{\sigma \gamma_i} P_i^{\sigma-1} Y_i} \frac{f_{ii}}{f_{ij}} &\geq 1 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A2})$$

using  $\tau_{ii} = 1$  and  $P_j^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{h=1}^J n_h \left( \frac{p_h \tau_{hj}}{\theta_h^{\gamma_j}} \right)^{1-\sigma}$ . Based on equation (A2), we can formulate the latent variable for the propensity of firms from country  $i$  to serve market  $j$  as

$$V_{ij}^* = (1 - \sigma) \ln \tau_{ij} + \sigma(\gamma_j - \gamma_i) \ln \theta_i + \ln(P_j^{\sigma-1} Y_j) - \ln(P_i^{\sigma-1} Y_i) + \ln \left( \frac{f_{ii}}{f_{ij}} \right) \quad (\text{A3})$$

$V_{ij} = 1$  if  $V_{ij}^* > 0$  and is unobserved otherwise

Following ?, one can aggregate the value of the varieties that are produced in country  $i$  to obtain the total value of wood production denoted by  $Q_i$ . Using the condition that the expenditures on wood originating from country  $i$  aggregated over all the importing countries has to be equal to the production value  $Q_i$ , one obtains

$$Q_i = \sum_{h=1}^J X_{ih} = p_i^{1-\sigma} n_i \sum_{h=1}^J \left( \frac{\tau_{ih} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_h} P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} Y_h \quad (\text{A4a})$$

$$\Rightarrow \Pi_i^{1-\sigma} := \sum_{h=1}^J \left( \frac{\tau_{ih} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_h} P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{\phi Y_h}{\phi Y} = \frac{Q_i}{\phi Y p_i^{1-\sigma} n_i} \quad (\text{A4b})$$

$$p_i^{1-\sigma} n_i = \frac{Q_i \Pi_i^{\sigma-1}}{\phi Y} \quad (\text{A4c})$$

with  $\sum_{i=1}^J Q_i = \phi Y$ . Using equations (A4a), (A4b) and (A4c), the total imports of TT of country  $j$  from country  $i$  can be described by

$$\begin{aligned}
X_{ij} &= n_i \left( \frac{p_i \tau_{ij} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_j} P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \phi Y_j \\
&= \left( \frac{\tau_{ij} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} P_j^{\sigma-1} \phi Y_j n_i p_i^{1-\sigma} \\
&= \left( \frac{\tau_{ij} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} P_j^{\sigma-1} \phi Y_j \Pi_i^{\sigma-1} Q_i \frac{1}{\phi Y} \\
&= \left( \frac{\tau_{ij} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} P_j^{\sigma-1} \Pi_i^{\sigma-1} \lambda_j \vartheta_i Y \phi
\end{aligned} \tag{A5}$$

where  $\lambda_j = Y_j/Y$  and  $\vartheta_i = Q_i/\phi Y$ . The trade resistance terms  $\Pi_i^{1-\sigma}$  and  $P_j^{1-\sigma}$  therefore simplify to

$$\Pi_i^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{h=1}^J \left( \frac{\tau_{ih} V_{ih}}{\theta_i^{\gamma_h} P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} \lambda_h \tag{A6}$$

$$P_j^{1-\sigma} = \sum_{h=1}^J \left( \frac{\tau_{hj} V_{hj}}{\theta_h^{\gamma_j}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \Pi_i^{\sigma-1} \vartheta_i \tag{A7}$$

Taking logs of (A5), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
\ln X_{ij} &= (1-\sigma) \ln \tau_{ij} + (\sigma-1) \gamma_j \ln \theta_i + \ln(\lambda_j P_j^{\sigma-1}) + \ln(\vartheta_i \Pi_i^{\sigma-1}) + \ln(Y \phi) \\
&\quad \text{if } V_{ij} = 1 \text{ and } 0 \text{ otherwise}
\end{aligned} \tag{A8}$$

As highlighted above, product quality influences the probability as well as the level of trading TT. The econometric specification in the following Section is based on equation (A3) which describes the selection process and on equation (A8) that pictures the trade flows.

Table A1: Variable description and sources

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Source</b>
$X_{ijz}$	Import value (in 1000 US\$) of bilateral trade flow of tropical timber products $z$ from exporter $i$ to importer $j$ .	UN Comtrade
$V_{ijz}$	Dummy variable = 1 if bilateral trade flow of tropical timber products $z$ from exporter $i$ to importer $j > 0$ , 0 otherwise.	
$RTA$	Dummy variable = 1 if a regional trade agreement between the two trading partners is in force, 0 otherwise.	WTO
$Distance$	Distance (in km) between the main cities of the two trading partners.	CEPII
$Contiguity$	Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners share a common border, 0 otherwise.	CEPII
$Comlanguage$	Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners share the same language, 0 otherwise.	CEPII
$Colony$	Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners have ever had a colonial link, 0 otherwise.	CEPII
$Comcolonizer$	Dummy variable = 1 if the two trading partners have had a common colonizer after 1945, 0 otherwise.	CEPII
$D_i$	Dummy variable = 1 if exporter is ITTA-member, 0 otherwise.	Annex A and B of ITTA 1994
$D_j$	Dummy variable = 1 if importer is ITTA-member, 0 otherwise.	Annex A and B of ITTA 1994
$D_i D_j$	Dummy variable = 1 if both trading partners are ITTA members, 0 otherwise.	Annex A and B of ITTA 1994
$y_j$	Importer's GDP per capita in constant 2000 US\$.	World Bank (WDI)
$y_i$	Exporters's GDP per capita in constant 2000 US\$.	World Bank (WDI)

Table A2: Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 1996 (HS1996)

Code	Description
<b>WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL; CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK; MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, OF ESPARTO OR OF OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND WICKERWORK</b>	
44	WOOD AND ARTICLES OF WOOD; WOOD CHARCOAL
4403	<b>Wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared</b> Other, of tropical wood specified in subheading note 1 to this chapter:
440341	Dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440349	Other
4407	<b>Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6 mm</b> Of tropical wood specified in subheading note 1 to this chapter:
440724	Virola, mahogany ( <i>Swietenia</i> spp.), imbuia and balsa
440725	Dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440726	White lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan
440729	Other
4408	<b>Veneer sheets and sheets for plywood (whether or not spliced) and other wood sawn lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness not exceeding 6 mm</b> Of tropical wood specified in subheading note 1 to this chapter:
440831	Dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440839	Other
4412	<b>Plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood</b> Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm thickness:
441213	With at least one outer ply of tropical wood specified in subheading note 1 to this chapter Other, with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood:
441222	With at least one ply of tropical wood specified in subheading note 1 to this chapter