

1 **Time preference risk preferences and behavioral response to health services of a park**
2 **land ecosystem: An experimental economics approach.**

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53 **Abstract (289/300 words)**

54 **Background:** Research suggests that individual time preference may be associated with
55 health-related behaviors, such as using the services of natural ecosystems for physical
56 activity. For example, those who maintain regular physical activity may place a higher value
57 on long-term health benefits, whereas individuals with inactive lifestyles may discount future
58 benefits more heavily. Empirical evidence of this type in physical activity is scant.

59

60 **Purpose:** To investigate the relationship between discount rates and risk preferences and
61 physical activity (measured objectively), and how these preferences can influence
62 participants' response to physical activity benefits, an important ecosystem service of natural
63 parklands..

64

65 **Methods:** Participants (n=176; mean age 42.2 years) were invited to take part in a behavioral
66 economic field experiment. Two economic experiments, using multiple price lists and
67 monetary trade-off tables involving real choices, were conducted face-to-face with
68 participants to measure their risk preferences and discount rates, respectively, and both
69 variables were jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. Secondly, individuals estimated risk
70 preferences and discount rates were related to minutes of objectively-measured physical
71 activity using a physical activity in a natural parkland using a loyalty card scheme while
72 controlling for socio-economic variables (e.g. age, gender).

73

74 **Results:** Those with higher discount rates ($p < 0.008$) and more risk averse ($p < 0.006$) did
75 significantly less physical activity than those with lower discount rates. In particular, the

76 negative association was significant for certain sub-groups, such as younger and married
77 adults (i.e. <43 years old), those with lower staff grade, and those who smoke ($p<0.05$). There
78 was also a significant association between discounting rate and trial retention ($p<0.10$).

79

80 **Conclusions:** Results show that individual's financial discounting rates are significantly
81 associated with their physical activity which has implications for the design of future novel
82 public health interventions using natural ecosystem services. Behavioral economic concepts
83 such as time and risk preferences have been largely overlooked and underutilized to date in
84 designing public health interventions and could shed light on important factors contributing to
85 uptake of the public health benefits of ecosystem services such as physical activity in natural
86 parklands.

87

88 **Keywords:** Physical Activity, Ecosystem Services of Natural Parkland. Time Preference,
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102 **Introduction**

103 Due to adverse trends in lifestyles factors, such as obesity and sedentary living, healthcare
104 systems throughout the developed world are facing a budgetary precipice because of an
105 inexorable growth in related conditions such as diabetes.¹ Thus policy makers are calling for
106 a major re-think about how to reverse these trends if we are to have any hope of improving
107 health and sustaining viable healthcare for an aging population.² Changing health-related
108 behaviors is not straight forward and there have been a number of high level government
109 reports,^{3,4} including from the so-called “Nudge Unit” in the UK Cabinet Office, and
110 influential academic literature that invokes the need to place *individual* behavior in a broader
111 behavioral psychology and socioecological context.^{5, 41-43} If an effective recipe for such
112 interventions can be found, the potential dividend is substantial.⁶

113

114 However, in practice most of us struggle to lead healthy lives but the question of what role
115 governments should play in cajoling us to do the right thing is contested, and some
116 governments (including the UK, Australia and Norway) have opted for policy “nudges” that
117 change the choice architecture, to make the healthier choices the easier ones.⁷ In particular,
118 the UK Government have supported the role of behavioral economics.⁷ Such approaches have
119 shown potential in public health,^{8,9} This paper looks at how public health can make use of the
120 well-established physical activity services of natural parkland ecosystems.

121

122 Of significance in this regard is the current debate on the importance of financial time
123 preferences for the design of public health interventions.¹⁰⁻¹³ Elsewhere this time issue is
124 referred to as the self-control problem,⁴¹ the procrastination problem,⁴² or the short term-self
125 versus long term-self problem.⁴³ Research has shown that individuals who were more

126 concerned with their future or long-term self's preferences were more likely to exhibit
127 behaviors associated with positive health consequences—such as physical activity and
128 seeking preventive healthcare—and less likely to procrastinate in adopting healthy behaviors
129 or exhibit behaviors associated with negative health consequences from lack of self-control—
130 such as smoking and eating unhealthy foods.¹⁴ However, Connel-Price found that more
131 “myopic” individuals (with a bias for the present) exercise more, a finding that is consistent
132 with a view of exercise as providing immediate gratification, in contrast to the view of
133 exercise as a “future-oriented” preventive health behavior, which is standard in the
134 literature.¹⁰ These divergent findings may be partially attributable to how time preferences
135 have been elicited (either through the use of hypothetical financial choices tasks, or in
136 economic experiments using real money) and whether or not risk preferences have been
137 estimated in tandem with the estimation of time preference effects.¹⁵⁻¹⁷

138
139 Furthermore, different time discount functions (exponential or hyperbolic) may be more or
140 less aligned to different types of preventive health-related behaviors among different types of
141 people, and so in the context of a financial incentive intervention, different incentive
142 structures may be required either to initiate behavior change in the short term or to maintain it
143 in the longer term.¹⁷ For example, physical activity participation may have short term
144 wellbeing gains and longer term health benefits whereas smoking cessation has short term
145 wellbeing losses coupled with longer term health gains and one can imagine that the same
146 discount function might not align equally well with participants making decisions over these
147 two behaviors.

148
149 In the context of a quasi-experimental trial of a workplace financial incentive scheme to
150 promote physical activity,¹⁸ behavioral economic experiments were conducted to investigate

151 the relationship between financial time and risk preferences and participation and physical
152 activity. We hypothesize that those who maintain regular physical activity in the intervention
153 are more concerned with long-term health and financial benefits, whereas inactive individuals
154 tend to discount both future benefits more. Further, we surmised that a more financially risk-
155 averse individual was more likely to have healthy habits than his/her less risk-averse
156 counterparts.

157

158 **Methods**

159 *Context*

160 The Physical Activity Loyalty (PAL) card scheme (12-week intervention) was a quasi-
161 experimental study where 406 office-based employees from a workplace setting were each
162 given a loyalty card to monitor their physical activity levels, by swiping their card at sensors
163 placed along designated walking routes, within the grounds of their workplace (office
164 buildings based in a natural parkland ecosystem). Participants were randomly allocated to
165 either an Incentive or No Incentive group. For the Incentive Group, minutes of physical
166 activity were converted into points and these points could be redeemed for rewards (retail
167 vouchers) sponsored by local businesses. The study collected data on socio-demographic
168 characteristics, objectively measured physical activity (throughout the 12-week intervention),
169 self-report physical activity (Global Physical Activity Questionnaire (GPAQ)), quality of life
170 (EuroQol 5D) and time discounting behavior at baseline, at the end of the intervention and
171 after 6-months. In summary, the study found a trend for ‘modest’ short term increases in
172 physical activity levels and quality of life among those receiving financial incentives.¹⁸

173

174 *Behavioral Economic Field Experiment*

175 A random sub-sample of participants from the Incentive and No Incentive Group were invited
176 via email (representative sample regarding age, gender and staff grade) to participate in the
177 behavioral economic field experiments following the 6-month data collection period. A
178 further random sample of participants (in the same workplace) that did not take part in the
179 intervention was invited to participate (Control Group). No further eligibility criteria were
180 applied. Those expressing an interest in participating were invited to one of the lunchtime
181 sessions. These sessions were facilitated by trained members of the research team (DH, GH,
182 SC), involved 8-16 participants on each occasion and took on average 45 minutes. Prior to
183 taking part, participants confirmed that they had read and understood the Participant
184 Information Sheet and provided written informed consent.

185
186 Participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire regarding socio-demographic
187 characteristics and financial information, including details regarding current and savings
188 accounts. The financial data was necessary in order to correctly estimate the discount rates of
189 individuals from the discounting task as their choices were censored by the borrowing and
190 saving rates they had access to outside of the discounting task. Ethical approval was obtained
191 from the Queen's University Belfast School of Medicine, Dentistry and Biomedical Sciences
192 Ethics Committee (ref: 12/04).

193

194 *Elicitation of Time and Risk Preference*

195 To elicit their financial discount rates participants were presented with multiple price lists
196 which offered a choice between two monetary amounts (Option A and Option B).^{19,20} Option
197 A paid a smaller amount (subject to 1-month front end delay) whilst Option B offered a larger
198 amount after a longer delay. Each multiple price list consisted of 10 choices between A and
199 B; the sooner amount (Option A) and the delay to receiving Option B remained constant,

200 however progressing down each choice task the interest rate, or reward, for delay increased.
201 According to their time preferences some participants will accept a smaller reward for a given
202 delay more than others. Six choice tasks corresponding to six different time delays (1 month,
203 2 months, 3 months, 4 months, 5 months and 6 months) were used. Each participant was
204 presented with three choice tasks randomly chosen from the six to control for order effects.
205 The one-month front-end delay treatment was used for both Options to avoid the potential
206 problem of extra transaction cost with Option B (which includes, credibility of the future
207 money actually being paid etc.). The starting principle for each choice task was £250
208 (approximately \$375) which is comparable to previous studies on financial discounting
209 conducted in developed societies, for instance Andersen et al (2014). Further details and an
210 example of the discount task are included in Appendix A.

211
212 To ensure that decisions were fully incentivized, each participant had a 10% chance of
213 receiving real monetary payments based on their decisions in the discounting task. Each
214 participant rolled a 10-sided die and received actual payment if they rolled a 1. A 6-sided die
215 was then rolled to determine which multiple price list was selected to be paid out, followed by
216 a 10-sided die to determine which decision within the list was paid (maximum payment
217 approximately \$487). The participant then received the payment that corresponded to their
218 decision in this task. Payments were paid via a direct bank transfer to the participants account
219 at the appropriate time delay.

220
221 To elicit risk preferences, participants were presented with a single multiple price list that
222 consisted of 10 decisions between two lotteries (Option A or Option B) (31, 32). Each lottery
223 offered a chance to receive a larger or smaller amount of money (See Appendix A). In the
224 first example, Option A was a lottery consisting of a 10% chance of receiving £140 (~\$210)

225 and a 90% chance of receiving £80 (~\$120). The difference between Option A and B is that
226 Option B was more risky and had a higher large amount (\$300) and a lower small amount
227 (\$30). As the participant moved down the 10 decisions in the list the chance of receiving the
228 larger amount in both lotteries increased. For example, a risk neutral participant would prefer
229 Option A because of its higher expected payoff up to choice 5 where they would be an equal
230 expected payoff for A and B and from Option 6 onward they would prefer Option B.
231 Furthermore, so-called “risk loving” participants, may choose Option B in choices before
232 choice 5 because of the larger high payment and risk averse participants may still choose
233 Option A in choices after choice 5 because of the larger low payment.

234

235 In the risk preference task a 10-sided die was rolled to determine if each participant received
236 payment, with participants receiving payment if a 1 was rolled. A second 10-sided die was
237 rolled to determine the pay-out choice and payment was determined by a third throw for the
238 chosen lottery (maximum payment \$300). Payments were made via a cheque at the end of the
239 field experiment session.

240

241 **Statistical analyses**

242 The analyses followed a three-step procedure. Firstly, discount rates and risk preferences were
243 jointly estimated by maximum likelihood following Andersen et al 2014 (See Appendix B for
244 a detailed description of the ML procedure). Data used for the ML estimation included
245 responses on three discount rate tasks and one risk preference task for each participant (total
246 n=176; n=95 were involved from the PAL scheme and n=81 from the Control Group). Since
247 each task involved a series of 10 binary choices, this resulted in 7040 observations. Secondly,
248 an ordinal variable (4 categories) was constructed to investigate the association between time
249 preferences, risk preferences and trial retention (see Table 4). Next, the predicted risk

250 preferences and discounting rates were regressed on levels of physical activity of participants
251 from the PAL scheme, while controlling for their socio-economic characteristics. The 17
252 participants that had zero minutes of physical activity were excluded to avoid a skewed
253 dependent variable, resulting in a sample of n=78 for the second-stage analysis. Heckman's
254 procedure was used to test the existence of sample selection bias.²⁰⁻²⁴ Finally, this model was
255 used to test if the associations of physical activity with risk preferences and discounting rates
256 were different across sub-groups including age, gender, staff-grade and other household
257 characteristics. Elasticities rather than coefficients were reported for discounting rates and risk
258 preferences whose means are smaller than 1 and have small variances The former is more
259 informative and reflects the proportional change in physical activity for a proportional change
260 in discounting rates and risk preferences. All data were analyzed using Stata version 13.

261

262 **Results**

263 *Socio-demographic Characteristics of Sample (n=176)*

264 Briefly, 58.5% (n=103) of the sample were female, mean age 42.2 years (95% CI 40.7, 43.7),
265 77% (n=135) were single, 67% (n=118) had no children and 47.2% (n=83) were smokers (see
266 Appendix C).

267

268 *Discounting Behavior*

269 The estimated discounting function assuming risk aversion is presented in Appendix D1.
270 Appendix D2 presents the summary statistics for the estimated discounting rates spread over
271 time horizons assuming risk aversion and risk neutrality, respectively. Hyperbolic discount
272 functions are observed for both cases, where discounting rates decrease with length of time
273 horizons (delays). More specifically, under risk aversion the discounting rate is 63.91% for
274 Horizon30, followed by a sharp fall to 31.39% for Horizon60, finally to 15.83% for

275 Horizon180.. The same conclusion holds also for the sub-group estimations (Appendix D3).
276 Further, after controlling for risk preference, hyperbolic discounting rate decreased.
277 Therefore, a hyperbolic discount function, controlled for risk preference, was used in
278 subsequent analyses.

279
280 Table 1 highlights the unadjusted differences in discounting rates across various subgroups.
281 Results demonstrate significantly higher discount rates among younger versus older adults
282 (i.e. <43 years old; discount rate for Horizon180= 16.2% versus 14.8%; $p=0.012$), those with
283 a lower staff grade versus higher staff grade show (discount rate for Horizon180= 13.9%
284 versus 17.8%; $p<0.000$), those who are single versus married (discount rate for
285 Horizon180=17.8% versus 14.8%; $p<0.00$) and having no children versus with children
286 (discount rate for Horizon180= 16.3% versus 13.4% $p<0.00$). These identified sub-groups
287 may be more likely to discount longer term benefits in favor of shorter term gains than their
288 comparators.

289
290 *Unadjusted Association between Discounting Behavior and Physical Activity*

291 Table 2 shows the association between minutes of objectively measured physical activity in
292 PAL and discounting rates for various sub-groups. Results for discounts rates and risk
293 preference are presented as elasticities and demonstrate that participants who have higher
294 discount rates [$p=0.008$] and are more risk averse [$p=0.006$] did significantly less physical
295 activity within the trial and suggests that a 1% increase in an individual's hyperbolic
296 discounting rate assuming risk aversion leads to a 3.0057% and 3.4362% decrease in physical
297 activity within the trial, respectively. Furthermore, those with a higher staff grade [$p=0.047$]
298 had lower discounting rates and did more physical activity within the trial. The negative
299 marginal effect of staff grade however indicates that physical activity within the trial decrease

300 by 109.76 minutes for a movement of staff grade from one grade to a higher one. Moreover,
301 non-smokers tended to have 186.28 higher minutes of physical activity within the trial than
302 smokers or ex-smokers ($p=0.034$).

303 *Sub-Groups Association between Discounting Behavior and Physical Activity*

304 Adjusted analyses showing the association between discounting rates and minutes of physical
305 activity for various sub-groups are presented in Table 3. Results show that young adults [
306 $p<0.05$], those with a lower staff grade [$p<0.05$] who smoke [$p<0.01$] and are married [
307 $p<0.01$] had a significant negative association between individual's discount rates and
308 physical activity. For example, this suggests that a 1% increase in a young (aged <43) adult's
309 hyperbolic discounting rate leads to a 5.3402 % decrease in physical activity within the trial.

310

311 *Association between Discounting Behavior, Risk Preference and Trial Retention*

312 Table 4 presents the results of the analyses investigating the influence of discount rates and
313 risk preference on individual's retention throughout the 12 weeks of the trial. Results
314 demonstrate that those with higher individual discount rates tended to drop out of the study
315 earlier [-34.21 (20.44); $p=0.094$]. Furthermore, males [0.698 (0.291); $p=0.016$], those who
316 worked part time [-1.798 (0.803); $p=0.025$], are single [1.162 (0.661); $p=0.079$] and have no
317 children [-0.653 (0.390); $p=0.094$] were more likely to remain throughout the period of the
318 trial. Results also showed no significant relationship between risk preference and retention in
319 the trial [-3.580 (5.242); $p=0.495$].

320

321 **Discussion**

322 *Key Findings*

323 The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between individuals financial
324 discount rates, risk preference and physical activity to increase our understanding of

325 individuals' time and risk preferences in relation to this specific and important health
326 behavior. Results use best practice objective measures of time and risk preference and
327 demonstrated a significant relationship between discount rates and physical activity within
328 our trial, i.e. those with higher individual financial discount rates and those who are more
329 financially risk averse did significantly less physical activity than those with lower discount
330 rates ($p < 0.05$). In particular higher discount rates are found among, younger adults (i.e. <43
331 years old), those who smoke and those who are married. These sub-groups did significantly
332 less physical activity within the trial ($p < 0.05$). There was also a significant association
333 between discounting rates and trial retention ($p < 0.10$).

334

335 *Time Preferences and Behavior Change*

336 These findings are similar to previous research which has shown that those with lower
337 discount rates (so-called future-oriented individuals) were more likely to demonstrate healthy
338 behaviors, such as being physically active.¹⁴ This is consistent with the view that physical
339 activity is a future-oriented health prevention behavior with long term benefits. However,
340 other research has shown contrasting findings suggesting that individuals with higher discount
341 rates did more physical activity,¹⁰ proposing that physical activity provides immediate
342 benefits such as improved mood and wellbeing. Indeed, physical activity behavior has proven
343 short and long term benefits. However, it is important to note that these contrasting findings
344 may be due to methodological differences in how time and risk preferences were elicited.
345 Results suggest that time preferences have implications for physical activity behavior change
346 and could (and should) be utilized and “exploited” in public health interventions. Time
347 preferences could be used to help target interventions more effectively. For example, socio-
348 economic hardships may shorten peoples time horizons and it has been suggested that low
349 socio-economic position (SEP) might also relate to present time orientation and impulsivity.²⁵

350 Our results also suggest that for certain sub-groups such as younger adults, those with
351 children and smokers higher discount rates significantly decrease physical activity, and
352 therefore could be the target of interventions aimed at changing temporal perspectives, an
353 emerging topic in intervention research.

354

355 Further, time preference rates are increasingly being used in designing interventions and have
356 been used to set realistic weight-loss goals in overweight and obese populations²⁶, with
357 implications for tailored communication for promoting healthy eating.²⁷ Furthermore, public
358 health campaigns might successfully employ “framing” manipulations to heighten a focus on
359 the delayed financial and other consequences associated with purchasing cigarettes. Also, the
360 effectiveness of financial incentive interventions to change behavior may be particularly
361 influenced by individual time preferences and may help those with high discount rates to
362 initiate healthy behaviors with long-term benefits.²⁸

363

364 *Changing Time Preferences*

365 Changing or reducing discounting rates (that are related to unhealthy behaviors), has
366 important implications for public health.²⁹ Although individual differences in discounting
367 rates have been commonly regarded as stable,³⁰ recent studies suggest that discounting rates
368 can be changed or modulated by therapeutic cognitive, behavioral, or structural environmental
369 manipulation.³¹

370 Shifting preferences to favor long-term outcomes requires either suppressing or ignoring
371 participant’s desire for the immediate reward or down-regulating its value (i.e. shifting
372 attentional resources from “now” to later). In particular, training cognitive skills such as
373 attention, working memory, and executive functioning is believed to be effective in changing
374 time preference biases.²⁹ Through the simple reframing of a message of a classical

375 discounting choice as “something now but nothing later” versus “nothing now but more later”
376 has been shown to decrease discount rates.²⁹ The Temporal Self-regulation Theory proposed
377 by Hall and Fong (2007)³² is a useful model to underpin such interventions.

378

379 Further, contingency management interventions³³ provide incremental reinforcement (in the
380 form of vouchers or other tangible rewards) that is contingent upon repetition of the desired
381 behavior. It forces participants to make a choice between “using now” and “earning no reward
382 later”. For example a contingency management intervention was shown to increase preference
383 for delayed hypothetical money over smaller values of immediately available cigarettes.³⁴

384

385 *Implications for Public Health*

386 Our findings, and those of others, suggest that time preferences have significant implications
387 for improving public health. Three promising implications include 1) utilizing individuals’
388 time preferences to better target behavior change interventions, for example, by targeting
389 interventions at those sub-groups with high discount rates; 2) taking account of time
390 preferences in the design of the intervention, for example, in goal setting and framing of
391 messages; 3) interventions to change time preferences. Such interventions could help bridge
392 the gap between previous interventions which tended to put too much weight on costs and
393 benefits that are immediate and too little on those that are delayed (known as present bias).⁸
394 Interventions of this kind could potentially improve multiple health outcomes as time
395 preferences are also predictive of health-related behaviors other than physical activity, such as
396 eating habits and smoking.²⁵

397 However, whilst research (such as the current study) has shed light on the association between
398 objectively measured time preferences and physical activity behavior, we know little about
399 the potential for interventions to “exploit” time preferences (i.e. interventions that

400 purposefully utilize time preferences to influence behavior change). Given the purported
401 influence of time preferences on a number of health behaviors, including physical activity,
402 more research is warranted.

403

404 *Implications for Future Research*

405 Despite a growing number of trials investigating the association between time preferences for
406 physical activity behavior change and an emerging literature on time preference
407 interventions,^{29,31} few studies have, by design, harnessed the power of time preferences within
408 bespoke public health interventions. Theory³² and a small number of simulated
409 “experiments”³⁵⁻³⁷ suggest that time preference parameters can mediate the transmission or
410 adoption of health behaviors. Whether such parameters could be harnessed to support a
411 successful public health intervention would depend on a range of practical and theoretical
412 issues that have yet to be studied. For example, what types of intervention would be favored?
413 What psycho-social theories might more plausibly underpin the design of a time preference
414 intervention? However, such interventions present various theoretical, methodological and
415 implementation challenges, for example, how to choose an appropriate control/comparator
416 group, how to measure intervention exposure. There are also a range of unanswered
417 questions. For example, previous research has demonstrated that the social environment, such
418 as social networks, can influence time preferences;³⁵⁻³⁷ however, we do not know at present
419 how best to incorporate social dynamics into time preference interventions.

420

421 *Strengths and Limitations*

422 To our knowledge this is one of few studies to investigate the influence of objectively
423 measured individual financial discount rates and risk preference on physical activity which
424 has important implications for designing public health interventions. Key strengths include

425 the use of an objective measure of physical activity and economic experiments with real
426 payments which have more predictive power than hypothetical methods²⁰ and self-reported
427 measures.³⁸⁻⁴⁰ Therefore, both physical activity and discounting rates were measured using
428 revealed preference methods which avoid the biases and inaccuracies of stated preference
429 methods. Further, discount rates were controlled for risk preferences by joint estimations to
430 eliminate bias caused by separate estimations of the variables.²¹ Andersen et al²⁰ have
431 demonstrated that when discount rates and risk preferences are elicited together, discount
432 rates can be significantly reduced. Substantial incentives present in these elicitation processes
433 ensured that participants responded carefully and truthfully by comparison with hypothetical
434 elicitation where the considerable effort required in the process is not earnings related.
435 However, results from the sub-group analyses should be interpreted with caution due to the
436 smaller sample size.

437

438 **Conclusion**

439 The decision to maintain a healthy habit, such as using the services of parkland ecosystems
440 for physical activity, involves a trade-off between a short-term cost, such as time and effort,
441 which are commonly identified as barriers to physical activity, and a long-term health benefit.
442 Understanding individuals' time and risk preference can therefore inform appropriate
443 interventions to address health behaviors using the services of natural ecosystems. Results
444 demonstrated that time preferences have a significant impact on physical activity levels in
445 general and the impact is more significant for specific sub-groups, for example, younger
446 adults and smokers in our study. Our research suggests that future public health interventions
447 should be cognizant of individuals' time preferences and incorporate them into intervention
448 design, such as goal setting and messaging. Further, recent research has demonstrated that
449 interventions can change time preferences. We argue that behavioral economic concepts such

450 as time and risk preferences have been largely overlooked and underutilized to date in
451 designing public health interventions and could shed light on important factors contributing to
452 uptake and maintenance of healthy behaviors which make use of natural ecosystems for
453 physical activity .

454

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- 607 43. Kahneman D. *Thinking, fast and slow.* Penguin Group: London, 2011.
- 608 Table 1: Differences in discounting rates across sub-groups
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635 Table 1: Differences in discounting rates across sub-groups

Characteristics	Grouping criteria	Number of observations	Horizon180 ¹	p-value
Age	Age<43	45	16.2%	0.012
	Age>43	50	14.8%	
Gender	Male	30	14.9%	0.092
	Female	48	15.8%	
Staff grade	If staff grade =G5+,G6,G7,DP,SO (higher staff grade)	57	13.9%	0.000
	If staff grade =EOI,EOII,AO,AA	38	17.8%	
Smoker	Current/former smoker	42	15.8%	0.145
	Non-smoker	53	15.2%	
Marital Status	Single	22	17.8%	0.000
	Couple	73	14.8%	
Number of children	Has child/children	28	13.4%	0.000
	No child/children	67	16.3%	

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637 Note: ¹Only the differences of Horizon180 among the sub-groups are compared, since
638 comparison of the other horizons leads to similar results. A p-value less than 0.05 indicates
639 the discounting rate of one sub-group is significantly higher or lower than that of its
640 counterpart sub-group.

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647 Table 2: Marginal effects on physical activity (mins/week) of explanatory variables using the
648 hyperbolic discount function

Dependent variable: PAL minutes	Coefficients	T-value	P-value
-discounting rate ^a	-3.0057*** (1.1048)	-2.72	0.008
-risk preference ^a	-3.4362*** (1.2047)	-2.85	0.006
Age	0.8974 (0.5765)	1.56	0.124
Male	99.53 (97.42)	1.02	0.310
Staff grade	-109.76** (54.24)	-2.02	0.047
Non-smoker	186.28** (86.14)	2.16	0.034
Household size	-91.84 (55.31)	-1.66	0.101
Constant	3840.19*** (1312.00)	2.93	0.005
R ²	0.175		
Observations	78		

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Note: ^a Elasticity with respect to PAL minutes; *Age* is measured by number of years; *Male* takes the value of 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise; *Staff grade* is measured on a 9-point scale with the lowest grade (AA) being 0 and the highest grade (G5+) 8; *Non-smoker* is measured as 1 if the participant is a non-smoker; otherwise 0; *Household size* is defined as the number of person in the household. ** indicates 5%.

Table 3: The association of hyperbolic -discounting and physical activity (mins/week) across sub-groups

Characteristics	Grouping criteria	Number of observations	Association of <i>discounting</i> with PAL minutes	R ²
Age	Age<43	36	-5.3402(2.1674)**	0.302
	Age>43	42	No association	----
Gender	Male	30	No association	----
	Female	48	No association	----
Staff grade	Higher staff grade	48	No association	----
	Lower staff grade	30	-2.7085(1.2187)**	0.514
Smoker	Current/former smoker	33	-4.1961(1.3019)***	0.313
	Non-smoker	45	No association	----
Marital status	Single	20	No association	----
	Couple	58	-3.8222(1.3181)***	0.189
Number of children	Has child/children	20	No association	----
	No child/children	58	No association	----

Note: ** indicates 5%; the coefficients of control variables, e.g. age, staff grade, smoker, income, single and child are not reported to reduce table size; the number of samples with PAL minutes larger than 0 is 78.

Table 4: Association between discounting rate risk preference and trial retention

Dependant variable: <i>Loyalty</i>	Coefficients	T-value	P-value
<i>Hyperbolic</i> discounting rate	-34.21(20.44)*	-1.67	0.094
<i>Hyperbolic</i> risk preference	-3.5798(5.24)	-0.68	0.495
Male	0.6982(0.2908)**	2.40	0.016
Full-time	-1.7980(0.8032)**	-2.24	0.025
Single	1.1623(0.6612)*	1.76	0.079
Has children	-0.6529(0.3902)*	-1.67	0.094
Household size	-0.2259(0.2240)	-1.01	0.313
Own house	0.8673(0.5177)*	1.68	0.094
Household income	0.3452(0.3137)	1.10	0.271
log likelihood	-105.04		
Observations	95		

Note: an ordinal variable was constructed to explain why some participants dropped out of the PAL scheme while others continued. The four categories included: 0 = if a participant never participated in the PAL scheme (0 mins/week throughout the 12-week intervention); 1 = if a participant did some physical activity (> 0 mins/week) during the first 4 weeks of the intervention but has 0 minutes for the rest of the intervention; 2 = if a participant did some physical activity in both week 1-4 and week 5-8 of the intervention but 0 minutes for the rest of the intervention; 3= if participants did some physical activity throughout the intervention (week 1-4, week 5-8, week 9-12).

Number of participants for each category: Category 0=17; Category =15; Category 2=11; Category=49.